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Abstract
Memory corruption vulnerabilities in C/C++ applica-
tions enable attackers to execute code, change data, and
leak information. Current memory sanitizers do not pro-
vide comprehensive coverage of a program’s data. In
particular, existing tools focus primarily on heap alloca-
tions with limited support for stack allocations and glob-
als. Additionally, existing tools focus on the main exe-
cutable with limited support for system libraries. Further,
they suffer from both false positives and false negatives.
We present Comprehensive User-Space Protection for
C/C++, CUP, an LLVM sanitizer that provides com-
plete spatial and probabilistic temporal memory safety
for C/C++ programs on 64-bit architectures (with a pro-
totype implementation for x86 64). CUP uses a hybrid
metadata scheme that supports all program data includ-
ing globals, heap, or stack and maintains the ABI. Com-
pared to existing approaches with the NIST Juliet test
suite, CUP reduces false negatives by 10x (0.1%) com-
pared to the state of the art LLVM sanitizers, and pro-
duces no false positives. CUP instruments all user-space
code, including libc and other system libraries, removing
them from the trusted code base.
1 Introduction
Despite extensive research into memory safety tech-
niques [38], exploits of memory corruptions remain com-
mon [40, 18, 36]. These attacks rely on the fact that
C/C++ require the programmer to manually enforce spa-
tial safety (bounds checks) and temporal safety (lifetime
checks). As the continuing stream of memory corruption
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) shows,
these programmer added checks are often inadequate.
Many of these bugs are in network facing code such as
browsers [28, 29] and servers [30, 31], allowing attackers
to illicitly gain arbitrary execution on remote systems.
Consequently, a memory safety sanitizer that compre-
hensively protects user-space is necessary to find and fix
these bugs.
To correctly address memory safety in user-space,
there are four main requirements. Precision addresses
spatial safety by requiring that exact bounds are main-
tained for all allocations. Object Awareness prevents
temporal errors by tracking whether the pointed-to object
is currently allocated or not. These two requirements are
sufficient to enforcememory safety. AddingComprehen-
sive Coverage expands this protection to all of user space
by requiring that all data on the stack, heap and globals
be protected. Comprehensive Coverage implies that all
code must be instrumented with the sanitizer, including
system libraries like libc. A sanitizer that meets these
three requirements is powerful enough to find all mem-
ory corruption vulnerabilities in user-space programs. To
be useful, such a sanitizer must also be usable in prac-
tice. Requiring Exactness – no false positives and min-
imal false negatives – ensures that bugs reported by a
sanitizer are real, and that all spatial and most temporal
violations are found. We discuss these challenges in § 3.
The research community has come up with many ap-
proaches that attempt to address memory safety. Ini-
tial efforts to address spatial safety relied on “fat point-
ers” that store bounds information inline with point-
ers [26, 14], which unfortunately breaks the Application
Binary Interface (ABI). SoftBound [24] moves metadata
to a disjoint table, maintaining the ABI, but adding over-
head to lookup the metadata associated with tables. Low-
Fat Pointers [9] reduces overhead by partitioning and
aligning memory allocations, allowing alignment based
bounds checks. This however rounds object sizes, and
alters the memory layout of the program. AddressSani-
tizer [35] (ASan) provides probabilistic spatial safety by
relying on poison zones between objects, but is vulnera-
ble to “long strides” that skip these zones. There are two
main approaches to temporal safety. Probabilistic ap-
proaches [2, 32] change the memory allocator to reduce
the frequency with which memory is reallocated. De-
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terministic schemes [25, 16] either maintain per pointer
metadata that knows whether an object is still allocated,
or invalidate all pointers when the object is deallocated.
Comprehensive Coverage is largely an open problem,
with prior work mostly ignoring the stack and neglect-
ing support for system libraries like libc. Low-Fat Point-
ers [9] is the only work to protect the stack – providing
only spatial safety. No existing work provides spatial and
temporal safety comprehensively for all user-space data
(stack, heap, globals) and code (program code, libc, li-
braries). Doing so requires a large amount of additional
metadata to protect the extra allocations § 2.2, which ex-
isting metadata schemes are unable to handle. Further,
the performance of existing tools does not allow them
to scale to handle the additional memory surface of the
stack and libc.
libc is a particularly critical part of user-space to pro-
tect. It is prone to memory errors, notably the mem* and
str* family of functions (memcpy, strcpy, . . . ). Mem-
ory errors in libc are not limited to these functions, how-
ever as shown by, e.g., GHOST [18] and a stack over-
flow in getaddrinfo [36]. Consequently, the entire libc
needs to be protected, not just certain interfaces.
Exactness shows how well a memory safety solu-
tion protects against vulnerabilities in practice. The
U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) maintains the Juliet test suite. Juliet consists of
thousands of examples of bugs, grouped by class from
the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE). Juliet re-
veals that existing, open source memory safety solu-
tions [35, 24, 25] have both false positives and a non-
trivial number of false negatives § 5.2.
CUP satisfies all four requirements for a powerful, us-
able memory sanitizer. We introduce a new hybrid meta-
data scheme which is capable of storing and using per
object metadata for the stack, libc, heaps, and globals.
Our metadata is precise and does not require altering the
program’s memory layout. Additionally, we introduce a
new way to check bounds that leverages hardware to in-
crease our check’s performance. Hybrid metadata allows
us to meet the Precision and Object Awareness require-
ments. CUP presents a novel use of escape analysis to re-
duce the amount of stack allocations without loss of pro-
tection. This reduction allows scaling our mechanism to
include all user-space data, satisfying the Comprehensive
Coverage requirement. Further, CUP successfully han-
dles all system libraries, including libc, the first memory
sanitizer to do so. Our evaluation on Juliet § 5.2 shows
that we have no false positives and 0.1%false negatives,
considerably advancing the state of the art for Exactness.
We present the following contributions:
• A new hybrid metadata scheme capable of tracking
any runtime information about object allocations,
and show how it can be applied to memory safety.
• The first sanitizer to fully protect user-space, includ-
ing libc
• A new static analysis for determining what stack
variables require active protection, and present a lo-
cal protection scheme for non-escaping stack vari-
ables
• Evaluation of a CUP prototype that, using our hy-
brid metadata model, results in (i) no false positives
and 0.1% false negatives on the NIST Juliet C/C++
test suite and (ii) reasonably low overhead (in line
with other sanitizers).
2 Background and Challenges
Our requirements for Precision and Object Awareness
are designed to enforce spatial and temporal memory
safety, which we define here and then use to introduce
the notion of a capability ID.
Spatial Vulnerabilities also known as bounds-safety
violations – are over- or under-flows of an object.
Over/under-flows occur when a pointer is increment-
ed/decremented beyond the bounds of the object that it
is currently associated with. Even if the out-of-bounds
pointer still points to a valid object, it does not have the
capability for the referenced object, and the operation re-
sults in a spatial memory safety violation. However, this
violation is only triggered on a dereference of an out-of-
bounds pointer. The C standard specifically allows out-
of-bounds pointers to exist.
Temporal Vulnerabilities also known as lifetime-
safety violations – occur when the object that a pointer’s
capability refers to is no longer allocated and that pointer
is dereferenced. For stack objects, this is because the
stack frame of the object is no longer valid (the function
it was created in returned); for heap objects, this happens
as a result of a free. These errors do not necessarily cause
segmentation faults (accesses to unmappedmemory), be-
cause the memory may have been reallocated to a new
object. Similarly, we cannot simply track what mem-
ory is currently allocated, because the object at a partic-
ular address can change, which still results in a temporal
safety violation. Temporal bugs are at the heart of many
recent exploits, e.g., for Google Chrome or Mozilla Fire-
fox as shown in the pwn2own contests [39]
Violating either type of memory safety can be formu-
lated as a capability violation. In our terminology, an
object is a discrete memory area, created by an alloca-
tion regardless of location (stack, heap, data, bss under
the Linux ELF format). A capability identifies a specific
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Memory Type Allocations
global 0.0006%
heap 0.07%
stack 99.9%
Table 1: Allocation distribution in SPEC CPU2006.
object, along with information about its bounds and allo-
cation status. Pointers retain a capability ID that identi-
fies the capability of the object that was most recently
assigned – either directly from the allocation or indi-
rectly by aliasing another pointer [12]. Capabilities form
a contract, upon dereference: (i) the pointer must be in
bounds, and (ii) the referenced object must still be allo-
cated. Violating the terms of this contract leads to spatial
or temporal memory safety errors respectively.
2.1 Vulnerable Objects
Comprehensive Coverage requires that we protect all
memory objects. However, some objects are inherently
safe, so it is sufficient to protect all vulnerable objects.
In particular, an object is vulnerable if accesses to it are
calculated dynamically, and not by fixed offsets. This
happens with pointers, and array accesses (which are
just syntactic sugar for pointer arithmetic). Dynamic ad-
dress calculation does not happen for variables on the
stack which are not arrays. Such local variables are ac-
cessed by fixed offsets, calculated at compile time, from
the stack frame, and can only be used maliciously after
an initial memory corruption. In particular, accessing a
pointer on the stack does not need to be protected, only
the pointer’s dereference, which dynamically looks up
memory.
2.2 Comprehensive Coverage Challenges
Understanding the scope of the challenge presented by
Comprehensive Coverage is critical to understanding
CUP’s design. To illustrate this challenge, we show
how intensively programs use different logical regions
of memory. While the operating system presents appli-
cations with a contiguous virtual memory address space,
that address space is partitioned into three logical groups
for data: global, heap, and stack spaces. Global memory
is allocated at application load-time, and is available for
the entire lifetime of the application, (i.e. global mem-
ory is never explicitly deallocated). Heap memory is re-
quested by the application through the new operator or
a call to malloc, and is deallocated via the delete op-
erator or a free call. Stack memory space is implicitly
allocated with function calls, and is again implicitly deal-
located with a return call.
Stack allocations account for almost all (99.9%) of
memory allocations in SPEC CPU2006 (see Table 1).
This measurement includes allocations made in libc.
Further, the latest data from van der Veen, et. al. [40, 43]
show that stack-based vulnerabilities are responsible for
an average of over 15% of memory related CVEs annu-
ally since tracking began in November 2002. By com-
parison, heap-based vulnerabilities account for an aver-
age of 25% of memory related CVEs over the same time
period. Given the stack’s exploitability and prevalence,
which stresses memory safety designs, protecting it is a
key design challenge for memory safety solutions.
3 Design
CUP provides precise, complete spatial memory safety
and stochastic temporal memory safety by protecting
all program data, including libc (and any other library).
Safety is enforced, for all program data, by dynami-
cally maintaining information about the size and alloca-
tion status of all objects that are vulnerable to memory
safety errors. This information is recorded through our
novel hybrid metadata scheme § 3.1. A compiler-based
instrumentation pass is used to add code that records and
checks metadata at runtime § 3.2. We provide a detailed
argument for why our instrumentation guarantees mem-
ory safety in § 3.3.
A powerful usable memory sanitizer must comply to
the following requirements:
I Precision. The solution must enforce exact object
bounds, ideally without changing memory layout
(i.e., spatial safety).
II Object Aware. The solution must remember the al-
location state of any object accessed through pointer
(i.e., temporal safety).
III Comprehensive Coverage. The solution must fully
protect a program’s user-space memory including
the stack, heap, and globals, requiring instrumen-
tation and analysis of all code, including system li-
braries such as libc (i.e., completeness).
IV Exactness. The solution must have no false posi-
tives, and any false negatives must be the result of
implementation limitations, not design limitations
(i.e., usefulness).
These requirements drive the design of CUP. Fully
complying with the Precision and Object Awareness re-
quirements relies on creating metadata for all allocated
objects. While it is possible [1, 9] to do alignment based
spatial checks without metadata, these schemes loose
precision, alter memory layout, and cannot support Ob-
ject Awareness. Object Awareness for temporal checks
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1 s t r u c t p o i n t e r f i e l d s {
i n t 3 2 id ;
3 i n t 3 2 o f f s e t ;
}
5
un ion e n r i c h e d p t r {
7 s t r u c t p o i n t e r f i e l d s c a p a b i l i t y ;
vo id ∗ p t r ;
9 }
Listing 1: Enriched Pointer
requires metadata to either lookup whether the object is
still valid [25] or to find all pointers associated with an
object and mark them invalid upon deallocations [16].
Consequently, CUP is a metadata based sanitizer.
CUP provides Comprehensive Coverage, and in par-
ticular protects globals, the heap, and stack by instru-
menting all code, including libc. Our hybrid metadata
scheme scales to handle the required number of alloca-
tions § 2.2, and our bounds check leverages the x86 64
architecture § 4.2.2 to perform the required volume of
checks quickly enough to be usable. Additionally, our
compiler pass is robust enough to handle libc § 4.3, mak-
ing CUP the first memory sanitizer to do so.
Exactness is achieved, in part, failing closed, making
a missing check equivalent to a failed check. We modify
the initial pointer returned by object allocation § 3.2, and
our modification marks it illegal for dereference. This
modification propagates through aliasing and all other
operations naturally. Consequently, we must check all
uses of the pointer for the program to execute correctly.
Such an approach results in optimal precision at the cost
of higher engineering burden (as shown in § 4 and § 5),
but dramatically reduces false negatives. False posi-
tives are prevented by maintaining accurate metadata,
and having it propagate automatically.
3.1 Hybrid Metadata Scheme
To provide Precision, Object Awareness, and Compre-
hensive Coverage, we introduce a new hybrid metadata
scheme that lets us embed a capability ID in a pointer
without changing its bit width. This capability ID ties a
pointer to the capability metadata for its underlying ob-
ject. Precision is provided by the metadata containing
exact bounds for every object, and by not rearranging the
memory layout. Object Awareness results from having a
unique metadata entry for each capability ID.
Providing Comprehensive Coverage requires assign-
ing a capability ID to all vulnerable objects in order to
associate their pointers with the object’s capability meta-
data. However, the capability ID space is fundamentally
limited by the width of pointers. To address this limit,
we allow capability IDs to be reused. Consequently, our
capability ID space only needs to support the maximum
number of simultaneously allocated objects. This allows
CUP to comprehensively cover globals, the heap, and
stack for all allocations in long running applications.
Our metadata scheme that draws inspiration from both
fat-pointers and disjoint metadata (and is thus a “hy-
brid” of the two) for 64-bit architectures. We conceptu-
ally reinterpret the pointer as a structure with two fields,
as illustrated by Listing 1. The first field contains the
pointer’s capability ID. The second field stores the off-
set into the object. This does not change the size of the
pointer, thus maintaining the ABI. Further, when point-
ers are assigned, the capability ID automatically transfers
to the assigned pointer without further instrumentation.
Hybrid metadata rewrites pointers to include the ca-
pability ID of their underlying object and current off-
set, creating enriched pointers. The size of the offset
field limits the size of supported object allocations. The
tradeoffs of the field sizes and our implementation deci-
sions are discussed in § 4.1. While we use it for memory
safety, this design allows access to arbitrary metadata,
and could be applied for, e.g., type safety, or any prop-
erty that requires runtime information about object allo-
cations.
Capability IDs in our hybrid-metadata scheme are in-
dexes into a metadata table. Each entry in this table is a
tuple of the base and end addresses for the memory ob-
ject, required for spatial safety checks. Each object that
is currently allocated has an entry in the table, leading
to a memory overhead of 16 bytes per allocated object.
Note that we do not require per-pointer metadata due to
our hybrid scheme. To reduce the number of required
IDs to the number of concurrently active objects, we al-
low capability IDs to be reused. Allowing ID reuse thus
allows us to protect long running programs, as our limit
is on concurrent pointers, not total allocations supported.
The security impact of ID reuse is evaluated in § 6.
The metadata table provides strong probabilistic Ob-
ject Awareness. For a temporal safety violation to go un-
detected, two conditions must hold. First, the capability
ID must have been reused. Second, the accessed mem-
ory must be within the bounds of the new object. Cur-
rent heap grooming techniques [11, 37] already require
a large number of allocations to manipulate heap state.
Adding the requirement that the same capability ID also
be used makes temporal violations harder. § 6 contains
other suggestions to further increase the difficulty.
We are aware of two memory safety concerns for hy-
brid metadta: (i) arithmetic overflows from the offset to
the capability ID, and (ii) protecting the metadata table.
The first concern is addressed by operating on the two
fields of the pointer separately. By treating them like
separate variables – while maintaining them as one en-
tity in memory – we prevent under/over flows from the
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offset field modifying the capability ID. The second con-
cern is not relevant for CUP– if all memory accesses
are checked, then the metadata table cannot be modified
through a memory violation.
3.2 Compiler Modifications
Our compiler adds instrumentation to create entries in
the metadata table and perform runtime checks. In par-
ticular, we first analyze all allocations (Comprehensive
Coverage), and filter them to the ones we must protect
to provide Precision and Object Awareness. This section
also shows how CUP fails closed, and checks all required
pointers, both of which contribute to its Exactness.
The analysis phase identifies when objects are allo-
cated or deallocated, and when pointers are dereferenced
through an intra-procedural analysis. All pointers that
are passed inter-procedurally are instrumented using our
metadata scheme, including all heap allocations.
We manually annotate libc § 4.3 to mark heap alloca-
tions. For global variables we protect arrays as entries
are referenced indirectly (i.e., with pointer arithmetic).
Similarly for stack allocations, we only protect arrays, as
well as any address taken variable. We leverage existing
LLVM analysis to find address taken variables.
Our analysis further divides protected stack alloca-
tions into (i) escaping and (ii) non-escaping allocations.
An allocation does not escape if the following holds: (i)
it does not have any aliases, (ii) it is not assigned to the
location referenced by a pointer passed in as a function
argument, (iii) it is not assigned to a global variable, (iv)
it is not passed to a sub-function (our analysis is intra-
procedural excluding inlining), and (v) is not returned
from the function. For those that escape, we use our
usual metadata scheme so that the bounds information
can be looked up in other functions. For those that do
not escape, we use an alternate instrumentation scheme.
The optimized instrumentation for non-escaping stack
variables scheme creates local variables with base and
bounds information. Since these allocations are only
used within the body of the function, we use local vari-
ables for checks instead of looking up the bounds in the
metadata table. This reduces pressure on our capability
IDs, helping us to achieve Comprehensive Coverage.
All other allocation sites requiringmetadata are instru-
mented to assign the object the next capability ID and to
create metadata (recording its precise base and end ad-
dresses) – returning an enriched pointer. We create meta-
data at allocation because it is the only time that we are
guaranteed to know the size of the object.
Identifying deallocations for objects is straightfor-
ward. Global objects are never deallocated over the life-
time of the program. Heap objects are explicitly deallo-
cated by, e.g., free() or delete. Stack objects are im-
plicitly deallocated when their dominating function re-
turns. Deallocations are instrumented to mark associated
metadata invalid and to reclaim the capability ID.
Pointer derefences are found by traversing the use-def
chain of identified pointers. Dereferences are analyzed
intra-procedurally, so we include pointers from function
arguments (including variadic arguments) and pointers
returned by called functions in the set of allocations for
this analysis. We instrument dereferences with a bounds
check. Note that the bounds check implicitly checks that
the pointer’s capability ID identifies the correct object.
See § 3.3 for a discussion of the safety guarantees.
CUP also inserts instrumentation to handle int to
pointer casts. These are commonly inserted by LLVM
during optimization, and have matching pointer to int
casts in the same function. In this case, and any others
where we can identify a matching pointer to int cast, we
restore the original capability ID to the pointer. If we are
unable to find a matching pointer to int cast, we default
to capability ID zero, which is all of user-space.
3.3 Memory Safety Guarantees
We discuss how CUP guarantees spatial memory safety
and probabilistically provides temporal safety. We as-
sume that all code is instrumented and capability IDs are
protected against arithmetic overflow (as proposed).
For code that we instrument, we keep a capability ID
(and thus metadata) for every memory object that can be
accessed via a pointer. This subset is sufficient to enforce
spatial memory safety. Objects that are not accessed via
pointers are guaranteed to be safe by the compiler (if you
are reading an int, it will always emit instructions to
read the correct 4 bytes from memory).
Pointers can be used to read or write arbitrary mem-
ory. Further, the address that they reference is often de-
termined dynamically. Thus, pointers require dynamic
checks at runtime for memory safety guarantees. As de-
fined in § 2, memory objects define capabilities for point-
ers. These capabilities include the size and validity of the
object. We only create capabilities when objects are al-
located at runtime. Objects can change size due to, e.g.,
realloc() calls, in which case we update our metadata
appropriately by changing base and end to the new val-
ues § 4.2.2. Thus, we always have correct metadata for
every object that has been created since the start of exe-
cution. The metadata for objects that have not been cre-
ated yet is invalid by default.
Pointers can receive values in five ways. First, point-
ers can be directly assigned from the memory allocation,
e.g., through a call to malloc(). We have instrumented
all allocations to return instrumented pointers. Second,
they can receive the address of an existing object, via the
& operator. We treat this as a special case of object allo-
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cation and instrument it. Third, pointers can be assigned
to the value of another pointer. As all existing point-
ers have been instrumented under the first two scenarios,
this case is covered as well. Fourth, pointers can be as-
signed the result of pointer arithmetic. This is handled
naturally, with our separate loads preventing overflows
into the capability ID. The fifth scenario is a cast from an
int to a pointer. This is exceedingly rare in well written
user-space code. However, the compiler frequently in-
serts these operations in optimized code. As a result, we
have to allow these operations. We assume that all ints
being cast to pointer were previously a pointers, and thus
instrumented.
So far we have established that all pointers are en-
riched with capabilities that accurately reflect the state
of the underlying memory object. Memory safety vio-
lations occur when pointers are dereferenced [38]. We
instrument every dereference to check the pointers capa-
bility and ensure that the dereference is valid. Because
each pointer has a capability and each capability is up-
to-date this ensures full memory safety.
A programs is memory safe before any pointer deref-
erence happens. We have shown that each type of pointer
dereference is protected. Consequently, every pointer
dereference is valid. Thus, our scheme preserves mem-
ory safety for the entire program.
4 Implementation
We implemented CUP on top of LLVM version 4.0.0-
rc1. Our compiler pass is ≈2,500 LoC (lines of code),
the runtime is another ≈300 LoC for ≈2,800 LoC total.
The line count excludes modifications to our libc, which
required only light annotations § 4.3. Our pass runs after
all optimizations, so that our instrumentation does not
prevent compiler optimizations. This also reduces the
total amount of memory locations that must be protected,
reducing capability ID pressure.
Here we discuss the technical details of how we im-
plemented CUP in accordance with our design § 3. We
first discuss how our hybrid metadata scheme is imple-
mented. Next we present how we find the sets of alloca-
tions and dereferences required by our design. With the
metadata implementation in mind, we then show how we
instrument allocations and dereferences. With these de-
tails established, we discuss the modifications required
to libc for it to work with CUP.
4.1 Metadata Implementation
Our metadata scheme consists of four elements: (i) a ta-
ble of information, (ii) a bookkeeping entry for the next
entry to use in that table, (iii) a free list (encoded in the
table) that enables us to reuse entries in the table, and
1 u i n t 3 2 n e x t e n t r y = 1 ;
3 / / Th is i s done i n l i n e , f u n c t i o n s a r e
i l l u s t r a t i v e
5 vo id ∗ o n a l l o c a t i o n ( s i z e t base , s i z e t end ) {
s i z e t o f f s e t = t a b l e [ n e x t e n t r y ] . base ;
7 t a b l e [ n e x t e n t r y ] . base = base ;
t a b l e [ n e x t e n t r y ] . end = end ;
9 u i n t 3 2 r e t = 0x80000000 & n e x t e n t r y ;
n e x t e n t r y = n e x t e n t r y + o f f s e t + 1 ;
11 r e t u r n ( vo id ∗ ) ( r e t << 32) ;
}
13 vo id o n d e a l l o c a t i o n ( i n t i d ) {
t a b l e [ i d ] . base = n e x t e n t r y − i d − 1 ;
15 t a b l e [ i d ] . end = 0 ;
n e x t e n t r y = id ;
17 }
Listing 2: Free List
(iv) how to divide the 64 bits in a pointer between the
capability ID and offset in our enriched pointers § 3.1.
Our metadata table is maintained as a global pointer to
a mmap’d region of memory. Similarly, the next entry in
that table is a global variable known as next entry.
By mmap’ing our metadata table, we allow the kernel
to lazily allocate pages, limiting our effective memory
overhead. Further, our ID reuse scheme reduces frag-
mentation of our metadata since it will always reuse a ca-
pability ID before allocating a new one. This also helps
improve the locality of our metadata lookups, reducing
cache pressure. Alternative reuse schemes with better
temporal security are discussed in § 6
To implement our capability ID reuse scheme, we up-
date next entry using our free list. The first entry in our
metadata table is reserved § 4.2.2, so next entry is ini-
tially one. The free list is encoded in the base fields of
each free entry in the table. These are all initialized to
zero. When an entry is free’d, the base field is set to the
offset to the next available table entry. When we add a
metadata entry, next entry is incremented, and the off-
set is added. When an object is deallocated, we have
to update the base field for its corresponding capability
ID (ID) to maintain the free list correctly. This requires
calculating the offset to the next free entry. C code illus-
trating these operations is in Listing 2.
The final implementation decision for our metadata
scheme is how to divide the 64 bits of the pointer be-
tween the capability ID and offset. We use the high
order 32 bits to store our enriched flag and capability
ID Figure 1. This leaves the low order 32 bits for the
offset. Limiting the offset to 32 bits does limit individual
object size to 4GB under our current design (with up to
231 such allocations). However, hardware naturally sup-
ports 32-bit manipulations, improving the performance
6
0x80000001
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Capability ID
Offset
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00000000
Figure 1: A potential pointer value after enrichment.
Note that the high order bit is 1 to indicate that it is en-
riched.
of our implementation. Further, having a 31-bit capabil-
ity ID space is crucial for protecting the entire applica-
tion § 2.2. The enriched bit helps make our engineering
effort easier - with it we can safely check an unenriched
pointer dereferences § 4.2.2, allowing us to be be conser-
vative and over-approximate in the set of pointer deref-
erences that we check § 4.2.2. The most common use
case for this is pointers returned from the kernel in, e.g.,
malloc(). Being able to handle non-enriched pointers
allows us to intervene only when the pointer is returned
to the user from libc § 4.3, and keep dynamic allocation
outside the trusted computing base.
With a minimal allocation size of 8 bytes, a 31-bit
ID allows for at least 16 GB of allocated memory. In
practice, much more memory can be allocated as ob-
jects are usually larger than 8 bytes. When fully allo-
cated, our metadata table uses 2GB * sizeof(struct
Metadata), see Listing 3. Note that CUP only allocates
pages for ID’s that are actually used.
4.2 Compiler Pass
Our LLVM compiler pass operates in two phases: (i)
analysis, and (ii) instrumentation. As per our design, the
analysis phase first determines a set of code points that
require us to add code to perform our runtime checks,
and the instrumentation phases adds these checks. These
checks have been optimized to let the hardware detect
bounds violations rather than doing comparisons in soft-
ware. Listing 3 has a running example for stack objects.
4.2.1 Analysis Implementation
The first task of our pass is to find the set of object alloca-
tions that we must protect to guarantee spatial safety § 3.
Heap-based allocations via malloc are found by our in-
strumented musl libc as detailed in § 4.3. Stack-based al-
locations are found by examining alloca instructions in
the LLVM Intermediate Representation (IR). These are
used to allocate all stack local variables. However, as
detailed in § 2.1 we only target allocations which can be
indirectly accessed via, e.g., pointers. In practice, this
means that we need to protect arrays and address-taken
variables on the stack, all others are accessed via fixed
1 s t r u c t Metada ta {
s i z e t base ;
3 s i z e t end ;
}
5
s t r u c t Metada ta ∗ t a b l e ;
7
/ / The f o l l ow i n g code i s p u r e l y i l l u s t r a t i v e .
9 / / Th is i s a l l done i n l i n e i n LLVM IR in
/ / our imp l emen t a t i on .
11
s t a t i c i n l i n e s i z e t check bounds ( s i z e t base ,
s i z e t end , s i z e t check ) {
13 s i z e t v a l i d = ( check − base ) | ( end − (
check + s i z e ) ) ;
v a l i d = v a l i d & 0x8000000000000000 ;
15 r e t u r n v a l i d ;
}
17
s t a t i c i n l i n e vo id ∗ check ( vo id ∗ p t r , u i n t 3 2
s i z e ) {
19 s i z e t tmp = ( s i z e t ) p t r ;
s i z e t mask = p t r >> 63 ;
21 u i n t 3 2 id = ( tmp >> 32) & 0 x 7 f f f f f f f ;
i d = id & mask ;
23 s i z e t base = t a b l e [ i d ] . base ;
s i z e t end = t a b l e [ i d ] . end ;
25 s i z e t check = base + ( u i n t 3 2 ) p t r ;
r e t u r n ( vo id ∗ ) ( check bounds ( base , end ,
check ) & check ) ;
27 }
29 vo id s e t ( i n t ∗x , i n t v a l ) {
∗ ( check ( x , 4 ) ) = v a l ;
31 }
33 / / example of d e r e f e r e n c i n g an e s c a p i n g and a
l o c a l s t a c k a r r a y
i n t main ( vo id ) {
35 i n t e s c a p e s [ 5 ] ;
e s c a p e s = o n a l l o c a t i o n ( escapes , e s c a p e s +5∗
4) ;
37 s e t ( e s c a p e s [ 2 ] , 10) ;
39 i n t l o c a l [ 5 ] ;
s i z e t l o c a l b a s e = l o c a l ;
41 s i z e t l o c a l e n d = l o c a l +5∗ 4 ;
∗ ( l o c a l & check bounds ( l o c a l b a s e ,
l o c a l e n d , l o c a l +2∗ 4) ) = 10 ;
43
o n d e a l l o c a t i o n ( e s c a p e s ) ;
45 }
Listing 3: Instrumentation Example
offsets from the frame pointer. Arrays are trivially found
by checking the type of alloca instruction as LLVM’s
type system for their IR includes arrays. LLVM’s IR has
no notion of the & operator. However, clang (the C/C++
front end) inserts markers – llvm.lifetime.start –
which we use to identify stack allocations that have their
address taken.
CUP also protects global variables. As shown in § 2.1,
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we only need to protect global arrays (logic is identi-
cal to protecting stack arrays). Global arrays present a
challenge for our instrumentation scheme. CUP relies
on changing pointer values. Unfortunately in C/C++ it
is illegal to assign to a global array once it has been al-
located. This means that we cannot change the pointer’s
value. To address this challenge, we create a new global
pointer to the first element in the array, and instrument
that pointer. We then replace all uses of the global ar-
ray with our new pointer that can be manipulated as de-
scribed above. The new pointer must be initialized at
runtime, once the address of the global array it replace
has been done this. To do this, we add a new global con-
structor that initializes our globals. The constructor is
given priority such that it runs before any code that relies
on our globals.
Once the analysis pass has identified the set of allo-
cations that need to be protected, it must find all deref-
erences of pointers to those objects. For stack and heap
variables, it uses an intra-procedural analysis to do this.
In particular, the analysis pass iterates over the set of pro-
tected stack allocations in the function, pointers passed in
as arguments (including variadic arguments), and point-
ers returned by called functions. For each such pointer,
it traces through the use-def chain looking for deref-
erences. In LLVM IR, this corresponds to load and
store instructions for read and write derefences respec-
tively. Once these are found, they are added either to the
list of local checks (if the originating allocation is non-
escaping), or the list of checks using our metadata that
need to be inserted.
Global variables are handled slightly differently.
LLVM maintains their use-def chains at the Module
level, corresponding to a source file. Therefore we ap-
ply the same analysis used for stack / heap variables,
but it operates over the entire module instead of intra-
procedurally.
4.2.2 Instrumentation
Our compiler is required to add two types of instrumen-
tation to the code: (i) allocation, and (ii) dereference.
Allocation instrumentation is responsible for assigning
a capability ID to the resulting pointer, creating meta-
data for it, and returning the enriched pointer. A sub-
category of allocation instrumentation is handling deal-
locations – where metadata must be invalidated and the
free list updated. Dereference instrumentation is respon-
sible for performing our bounds check, and returning a
pointer that can be dereferenced. While our runtime li-
brary provides functions for the functionality described
in this section (for use in manual annotations), all of our
compiler added checks are done inline. Listing 2 and
Listing 3 contain examples for these operations for stack
based allocations.
Allocation Instrumentation CUP requires us to
rewrite the pointer for every allocation that we iden-
tify as potentially unsafe. Our rewritten or “enriched”
pointer contains the assigned capability ID, has the en-
riched bit set, and the lower 32 bits (which encode the
distance from the base pointer) are set to 0. All uses
of the original pointer are then replaced with the new,
instrumented pointer. At allocation time, we use the
next entry global variable as the capability ID, and then
update next entry as described in § 4.1. See the escapes
variable in main() in Listing 3.
Note that this creates a pointer which cannot be deref-
erenced on x86 64, which requires that the high order 16
bits all be 1 (kernel-space) or 0 (user-space). As a result,
any dereference without a check will cause a hardware
fault. Consequently, for any program that runs correctly
we can guarantee that all pointers to protected allocations
are checked on dereference. This is in contrast to other
schemes [24] that fail open, i.e., silently continue, when
a check is missed, sacrificing precision.
When an object is deallocated, we insert code to up-
date the free list in our metadata table as per § 4.1
and Listing 2. Further, we mark the end address 0 to
invalidate the entry.
Dereference Instrumentation To dereference a
pointer, two things need to be done. First, we need
to recreate the unenriched pointer. Then, using the
metadata from the enriched pointer’s capability ID,
we need to make sure that the unenriched pointer is in
bounds.
To create the unenriched pointer, we first retrieve the
high order bit (which indicates whether the pointer is en-
riched or not). We create a 64-bit mask with the value
of this bit. We then extract the capability ID, and AND
it with this mask. If the pointer was not enriched, this
yields an ID of 0 and otherwise preserves the capability
ID. We then lookup the base pointer for the capability
ID, and add the offset to it. See check in Listing 3.
In the case where the pointer was not enriched, we
lookup the reserved entry 0 in our metadata table. This
entry has base and end values that reflect all of user-
space (0 to 0xffffffffffff). Thus, performing our unen-
richment on an unenriched pointer has no effect, and our
spatial check below simply sandboxes it in user-space.
Our spatial check performs the requisite lower and up-
per bounds check. Note, however, that on the upper
bound we have to adjust for the number of bytes being
read or written. This adjustment adds significantly to
our improved precision against other mechanisms § 5.2.
To illustrate its importance consider the following. An
int pointer is being dereferenced, meaning the last byte
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used is the pointer base + 4 bytes - 1, while for a char
pointer, the last byte used is the pointer base + 1 byte - 1.
Equation 1 shows our bounds check formula, the size of
the pointer dereferenced is element size.
base ≤ ptr+ element size− 1< base+ length (1)
Hardware Enforcement The check in Equation 1
could naively be implemented with comparison instruc-
tions and a jump – resulting in additional overhead. We
propose a novel way to leverage hardware to perform
the check for us. We observe that the difference be-
tween the adjusted pointer and the base address should
always be greater than or equal to 0. Similarly, the
end address minus the adjusted pointer should always be
greater than or equal to 0. Consequently, the high order
bit in the differences should always be 0 (x86 64 with
two’s complement arithmetic). We OR these two differ-
ences together, mask off the low order 63 bits, and then
OR the result into the unenriched pointer. If it passed
the check, this changes nothing. If it failed the check,
it results in a invalid pointer, causing a segfault when
dereferenced. Listing 3 shows this optimized check in
check bounds().
4.3 LIBC
Libc is the foundation of nearly every C program and
therefore linked with nearly every executable. Unfor-
tunately, many of its most popular functions such as
the str* and mem* functions are highly prone to mem-
ory safety errors. They make assumptions about pro-
gram state (e.g., null terminated strings, buffer sizes)
and rely on them without checking that they hold. Prior
work [24, 35, 9] assumes that libc is part of the trusted
code base (TCB).
In contrast, CUP removes libc from the TCB by instru-
menting libc with our compiler. The majority of the in-
strumentation is automatic, with few exceptions such as
the memory allocator, system calls, and functions imple-
mented in assembly code. The most mature libc imple-
mentation that we are aware of that compiles with Clang-
4.0.0-rc1 is musl [20]. Our instrumented musl libc is part
of CUP.
4.3.1 Dynamic Memory Allocator
The dynamic memory allocator is responsible for re-
questing memory for the process from the kernel, and
returning it. To do so efficiently, most allocators – in-
cluding musl – modify user requests. In particular, musl
rounds up the number of bytes requested. Further, musl
maintains metadata inline on the heap in the form of
headers before each allocated segment. Consequently,
the allocator’s view of memory is different than that of
the program.
To compensate for this difference, we manually instru-
mented musl’s allocator. We ensure that pointers are in-
strumentedwith the programmer specified length, not the
rounded length. Further, we manually unenrich pointers
as necessary to allow musl to read the header blocks that
proceed heap data segments. Without our intervention,
these would appear to be out of bounds.
An interesting corner case is realloc(). By design
it changes the end address. Additionally, it can change
the base address if it was forced to move the allocation
to find sufficient room. We manually intervene in both
cases to keep our metadata table up-to-date.
4.3.2 System Calls
System calls are made through a dedicated API contain-
ing inline assembly in musl. We initially instrumented
this API to ensure that no enriched pointers are passed
to the kernel. Unfortunately, this is insufficient as structs
containing pointers are passed to the kernel (FILE structs
in particular). Consequently, we required more context
than the narrow system call API provided. This forced
us to find the actual system call sites and add additional
instrumentation to ensure that all pointers passed to the
kernel are unenriched.
4.3.3 Assembly Functions
musl implements many of the mem*, str* functions in
assembly for x86. As a result, clang is unaware of
these functions as they are directly assembled and linked
in. We therefore manually instrumented these functions.
This required minimal intervention to call the relevant
function in our runtime library, while preserving the reg-
ister state and return value of the functions we annotated.
4.3.4 Memory Safety in Musl
musl itself is not memory safe. As an example,
strlen() reads 4 bytes at a time as an optimization.
This means that it can overread by as many as 3 bytes.
To prevent this, we modify strlen() to read byte by
byte. Our experiments show that this does not effect per-
formance for strings of length less than O(105). Other
str* functions overread as well when looking for the
NULL terminator.
5 Evaluation
We evaluate CUP along two axes. First, we show that its
performance is competitive with existing sanitizers. Fur-
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musl-baseline 382 213 386 278 371 369 367 327 166 431 278 183 201 403 297
ASan - 261 - 596 630 264 - 464 369 444 377 261 243 - 369
SoftBound+CETS 2004 - - - 1372 - - - - 1543 - - 409 - 1148
CUP 1131 503 1255 1268 1192 391 1196 955 - 638 905 - 370 1185 839
Table 2: Performance Results. † indicates C++ benchmark
CUP 158%
ASan 38%
SoftBound+CETS 53%
Table 3: Percent Overhead over Baseline
CUP 83%
SoftBound+CETS 134%
Table 4: Percent Overhead over ASan
ther, our performance is markedly better than other tools
that provide both Precision and Object Awareness, given
that CUP provides Comprehensive Coverage. Second,
we demonstrate our Exactness, showing that we have no
false positives and two orders of magnitude fewer false
negatives than existing open source tools on the NIST
Juliet suite. Furthermore, the false negatives that we do
register are architecturally dependent, and do not actually
represent a failure to fulfill memory safety requirements.
All experiments were run on Ubuntu 14.04 with a
3.40GHz Intel Core i7-6700 CPU and 16GB of memory.
5.1 Performance
Performance is an important requirement for any us-
able sanitizer. We evaluate the performance of CUP
with musl. For comparison, we also measure the per-
formance overhead of similar sanitizers, using glibc as
the baseline. AddressSanitizer is the closest open source
related work that is compatible with LLVM-4.0.0-rc1.
SoftBound+CETS is open source, but relies on LLVM-
3.4 and can only run a small subset of SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks. Its performance results are reported here,
but are not directly comparable. Low-Fat Pointers is not
yet open source.
Table 3 summarizes the performance results for CUP.
We have 158% overhead vs baseline, compared to 38%
for AddressSanitizer. Comparing CUP directly with Ad-
dressSanitizer Table 4 shows that we have 83% overhead
relative to AddressSanitizer. On benchmarks where both
run, CUP is faster than SoftBound+CETS. Further, com-
pared to these existing tools, we offer stronger, more
precise coverage § 5.2. As we show in § 5.2, CUP has
10x the coverage of SoftBound+CETS, for less over-
head. Low-Fat Pointers [9] reports 16% to 62% over-
head depending on their optimization level. They achieve
this by using clever alignment tricks to avoid metadata
look ups. This has two drawbacks: (i) they round allo-
cations up to the nearest power of two, losing precision
for bounds checks, and (ii) their design cannot support
temporal checks which require metadata.
5.2 Juliet Suite
NIST maintains the Juliet test suite, a large collection
of C source code that demonstrates common program-
ming practices that lead to memory vulnerabilities, orga-
nized by Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) num-
bers [15]. Every example comes with two versions: one
that exhibits the bug and one that is patched. We ex-
tracted the subset of tests for heap and stack buffers1.
We compiled all sources with our pass, as well as with
SoftBound+CETS2 and with AddressSanitizer [35]. Ev-
ery patched test should execute normally. If a memory
protection mechanism prematurely kills a patched test,
we call it a false positive. Conversely, every buggy test
should be stopped by the memory safety mechanism. All
three memory protection mechanisms kill the process in
case of a memory violation. If the process is not killed,
we report a false negative.
Table 5 summarizes the results. Out of 4,038 tests that
should not fail, we incur no false positives. ASan and
SoftBound+CETS show a 0% and 0.3% respectively. We
produce a 0.1% false negative rate, while ASan produces
an 8% false negative rate, and SoftBound+CETS has a
25% false negative rate.
The false positives that SoftBound+CETS registers
comes from variations in how the alloca() function
1The tests that match the following regular expression:
CWE(121|122)+((?!socket).)*(\.c)$
2git commit 9a9c09f04e16f2d1ef3a906fd138a7b89df44996
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False Neg. False Pos.
CUP 4 (0.1%) 0 (0%)
SoftBound+CETS 1032 (25%) 12 (0.3%)
AddressSanitizer 315 (8%) 0 (0%)
Total Tests 4038
Table 5: Juliet Suite Results
call is handled. alloca() is compiler dependent [17].
The failing examples use alloca which is wrapped
around a static function. SoftBound+CETS uses clang
3.4 as the underlying compiler, and CUP uses clang 4.0.
Consequently, SoftBound+CETS handles the examples
differently, and sees the memory from alloca as invalid,
while CUP does not.
Our false negatives are architecturally dependent. The
examples we fail to catch attempt to allocate memory
for a structure containing exactly two ints. However,
erroneously, the examples use the size of a pointer to
the two int structure when allocating memory. (e.g.
malloc(sizeof(TwoIntStruct*))). On architec-
tures which do not define pointers as twice the size of
ints (including 32-bit x86), such a mistake would lead
to a memory violation. With the x86 64 architecture,
though, the size of a pointer and the size of the two int
structure are the same. Thus, while semantically incor-
rect, no true memory violation occurs. No false positives,
combined with no true false negatives shows that CUP
fulfills the Exactness requirement.
ASan and SoftBound+CETS higher false negative rate
results from their incomplete coverage. In particular,
many of the Juliet examples involve calling libc functions
to copy strings and buffers (e.g. strcpy and memcpy).
Neither ASan nor SoftBound+CETS are able to pro-
tect against unsafe libc calls. Our instrumentation of
libc § 4.3 allows us to properly detect memory violations
in these calls. Further, our adjustment for read / write
size § 4.2.2 allows us to catch additional memory safety
violations.
Listing 4 provides source based on a Juliet example 3
that CUP properly handles, and which ASan handles in-
correctly. The code allocates 10 bytes on the stack, sets
the bytes to ASCII A, and then sets a random charac-
ter to ASCII B. ASan protects the stack by surrounding
stack objects with poison zones. However, depending on
the value of data, line 5 could be outside the allocated
objects and outside the poison region – a classic buffer
overwrite. CUP’s analysis detects that buffer leaves
main through the call to memset, and inserts the appro-
priate runtime checks. If data is greater than 10, those
runtime checks fail.
3CWE121 Stack Based Buffer Overflow CWE129 rand 22 bad()
1 i n t main ( ) {
i n t d a t a = rand ( ) ;
3 cha r ∗ b u f f e r = ( cha r ∗ ) a l l o c ( 10 , 1 ) ;
memset ( ( vo id ∗ ) b u f f e r , ’A’ , 10) ;
5 b u f f e r [ d a t a ] = ’B ’ ;
}
Listing 4: Example of code ASan fails to protect
6 Discussion
We discuss several design aspects of CUP, how we han-
dle specific corner cases, potential for optimization, and
further extensions.
Reducing instrumentation. Prior work on reducing
the amount of required runtime checks has focused on
type systems. CCured [26] infers three types of point-
ers: safe, sequential, and wild. Safe pointers are stati-
cally proven to stay in bounds. Sequential pointers are
only incremented (or decremented) – e.g., iterating over
an array in a loop. All remaining pointers are classified
as wild. Leveraging CCured-style type systems to fur-
ther optimize memory safety solutions is left as an open
problem.
Optimization through LTO. CUP does not depend on
Link Time Optimization (LTO). However, LTO makes
it possible to inline functions across source files, and
generally flattens code. Inlining would increase the ef-
fectiveness of our stack optimization and further reduce
the amount of instrumented stack variables, reducing the
number of IDs that a program consumes. Reducing the
IDs a program uses, reduces the overhead for ID man-
agement and resources used by CUP.
Arithmetic overflow. Our hybrid metadata scheme
stores the capability ID as part of the pointer. Pointer
arithmetic can potentially modify the ID, allowing an
adversary to chose the metadata the pointer is checked
against. To prevent this attack vector, the upper and
lower 32 bits of the pointer are loaded separately. The
compiler enforces that any arithmetic operations only
happen on the lower 32 bits, which contain the pointer’s
offset. This protects our capability ID frommanipulation
by an adversary.
Stronger temporal protection. As discussed in § 3.1,
it is possible (albeit difficult) for an attacker to perform
a temporal attack on software instrumented with CUP.
If CUP were deployed as an active defense, the difficulty
of a successful temporal attack could be increased by uti-
lizing a randomized memory allocator like DieHard [2]
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or DieHarder [32]. Such allocators randomize heap al-
locations, making heap grooming [11, 37] much more
difficult. Beyond getting the addresses to line up, the
increased number of required allocations makes match-
ing the capability IDs even harder. This renders a suc-
cessful use-after-free attack highly unlikely, with mini-
mal additional overhead. Additionally, a “lock and key”
scheme [25] can be added to our metadata. Alternatively,
our metadata can be extended to include a dangnull [16]-
style approach that records how many references are still
pointing to an object and either explicitly invalidating
those references or waiting until the last reference has
been overwritten before reusing IDs.
Uninstrumented code. CUP supports linking with
uninstrumented libraries. Enriched pointers are the same
size as regular pointers, maintaining the ABI. Derefer-
encing enriched pointers in uninstrumented code results,
by design, in a segmentation fault. A segmentation fault
handler can, on demand, dereference individual point-
ers. As the memory allocator is instrumented, memory
allocations in uninstrumented code will return enriched
pointers. Stack allocations on the other hand will not be
protected in uninstrumented code. While this option al-
lows compatibility, it clearly results in high performance
overhead. Note that, thanks to support for recompiling
all user-space code, this situation is limited to legacy
code.
Uninstrumented globals. We currently cannot handle
the corner case of external global arrays defined in unin-
strumented code. Our pass assumes such arrays have
been instrumented, and so adds an extern pointer to
them § 4.2.1. If the global was defined in uninstrumented
code, this assumption does not hold. Consequently, our
extern pointer does not exist, and the code will not link.
Note that such a situation is unlikely, as we support full
user-space instrumentation.
Assembly code. CUP automatically instruments all
code written in high level languages; our analysis pass
runs on LLVM IR. Our analysis does not (and cannot) in-
strument inline assembly and assembly files due to miss-
ing type information. We rely on the programmer to ei-
ther instrument the assembly code accordingly or to fall
back on supporting uninstrumented code as mentioned
above.
Data races. CUP does not protect against inter-thread
races of updates to metadata (e.g., one thread frees an
object while the other thread is dereferencing a pointer).
We leave the design of a low-overhead metadata locking
scheme as future work. Note that this limitation is shared
with other sanitizers.
7 Related Work
Precision is required to enforce spatial memory safety
(bounds checks). There is a class of memory safety
solutions that only approximately enforce this prop-
erty [1, 35, 9]. These solutions make use of techniques
such as poisoned zones – detecting spatial violations
within limits, or rounding allocation size – which causes
the executed program to differ from the programmers in-
tent and results in challenges when trying to handle intra-
array and intra-struct checks. By changing the memory
layout and not enforcing exact bounds, these solutions
are not faithful to the programmer’s intent. [24] is the
existing solution which best satisfies this requirement,
though it has other limitations.
Object-based memory checking [5, 7, 10] keeps track
of metadata on a per-object basis. Since the meta-data is
associated on a per object level, every pointer to the ob-
ject shares the same metadata. Object layout in memory
is generally left unchanged, which increases ABI com-
patibility. However, pointer casts and pointers to subfield
struct members are unhandled [23]. SAFECode [8] is an
example efficient object-based memory checking.
Recently, Intel has started to addmemory safety exten-
sions, called Intel MPX, to their processors, starting with
the Skylake architecture [13]. These extensions add ad-
ditional registers to store bounds information at runtime.
While effective at detecting spatial memory violations,
MPX is incapable of detecting temporal violations [33],
and typecasts to integers are not protected. In addition,
current implementations of MPX incur a large memory
penalty of up to 4 times normal usage [19]. Other ISA
extensions include Watchdog [22], WatchdogLite [21],
HardBound [6], and Chuang et al. [4]. As a software
only solution, CUP does not require extra hardware or
ISA extensions.
Object Awareness is required to prevent temporal
memory safety violations (lifetime errors). This prop-
erty requires remembering for every pointer whether the
object to which it is assigned is still allocated. Address-
Sanitizer [35] and Low-Fat Pointers [9] make no attempt
to do this (and their metadata does not support this prop-
erty), while SoftBound+CETS [25] enforces this prop-
erty. AddressSanitizer and Low-Fat Pointers do not
maintain metadata either per object or per pointer. Ob-
ject Awareness requires either per objecct or per pointer
metadata. Consequently, they fundamentally cannot en-
force temporal safety because their (current) metadata
cannot be object aware.
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Temporal only detectors include DangNull [16] and
Undangle [3] from Microsoft. DangNull automatically
nullifies all pointers to an object when it is freed. Un-
dangle uses an early detection technique to identify un-
safe pointers when they are created, instead of being
used. CUP only provides a probabilistic temporal de-
fense, however, DangNull and Undangle lack any spatial
protection.
Comprehensive Coverage is required to fully protect
the program. As shown in § 2.2 stack objects are the
overwhelming majority of allocations, and to this day a
significant portion of memory safety Common Vulnera-
bilities and Exposures (CVE) are stack related. Our eval-
uation of SoftBound+CETS § 5.2 shows that it has poor
coverage – missing many stack vulnerabilities. Address-
Sanitizer and Low-Fat Pointers do better. AddressSani-
tizer protects the stack through the use of poisoned zones,
and, as illustrated in § 5.2 cannot handle all invalid stack
memory accesses. Additionally, neither of them supports
compiling libc – leaving the window open for vulnera-
bilities such as GHOST [18]. Tripwires [27, 34, 41, 44]
are a way to detect some spatial and temporal memory
errors [35, 42]. Tripwires place a region of invalid mem-
ory around objects to avoid small stride overflows and
underflows. Temporal violations are caught by register-
ing memory freed as invalid, until reclaimed. Tripwires,
however, miss long stride memory errors, and thus can-
not be said to be completely secure.
The state-of-the-art C/C++ pointer-based memory
safety scheme is SoftBound+CETS [23]. Other pointer-
based schemes include CCured [26] and Cyclone [14].
CCured uses a fat pointer to store metadata, as well as
programmer annotations for indicating safe casts. Un-
fortunately, fat pointers break the ABI, and programmer
annotations can significantly increase developer time.
Even with annotations, CCured fails to handle structure
changes. Cyclone also uses a fat pointer scheme, but
does not guarantee full memory safety. We refer to [23]
for a survey of other related work on memory safety and
a discussion on different pointer metadata schemes.
8 Conclusion
We present CUP, a C/C++ memory safety mechanism
that provides full user-space protection, including libc,
and strong probabilistic temporal protection. It is the
first such mechanism that satisfies all requirements for
a complete memory safety solution, while incurring only
modest performance overhead compared with the state-
of-the-art. CUP is exact, object aware, comprehensive
in its coverage, and precise. We fully protect all user-
space memory, including the stack, which, despite being
the largest source of pointers, remained largely unpro-
tected. Finally, we produce zero false negatives and zero
authentic false positives in the NIST Juliet Vulnerability
example suite, which represents a significant advance-
ment over existing memory safety mechanisms.
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